Daily Papers

The harness surrounding a language model is a central determinant of agent performance. Recent methods optimize harnesses by searching over complete programs, where individual mechanisms are difficult to isolate and reuse. We introduce PluginRSI, which represents a harness as a composition of atomized plugins and organizes harness evolution around these plugins. Individual plugins are improved independently and accumulated in a shared library, then recombined into new harnesses at each iteration. PluginRSI improves over existing harness optimization methods across software engineering, command-line interaction, and question-answering tasks. The resulting harnesses retain their advantage when transferred to other solver models without further optimization. The evolved plugin library accelerates subsequent optimization from the initial harness, which helps faster and higher convergence on unseen tasks. These results show that accumulating reusable mechanisms provides an effective basis for continued harness improvement.

AI coding agents, software tools that automate development tasks through reasoning and tool use, are increasingly extended through plugin marketplaces, yet the structure, maintenance, and co-evolution dynamics of these emerging repositories remain empirically unexplored. Unlike traditional software packages that deliver functionality through source code, agent plugins deliver functionality through a combination of natural-language instruction files, scripts, and configuration files, raising the question of whether these plugins are maintained artifacts that co-evolve across components, or one-off artifacts that developers write once and do not need to revisit. To study the maintenance and co-evolution of agent plugins, we conduct an empirical study of 1,926 repositories hosting Claude Code plugin marketplaces, analyzing 8,351 plugins and 77,773 commits across 2,018 marketplaces. We find that the marketplace is expanding rapidly, plugin-touching commit activity growing 8.8x over six months after the October 2025 launch, and plugins targeting Software Engineering tasks accounting for 61.3% of all plugins. Plugin development is predominantly feature-driven, with feature commits occurring at more than twice the rate of conventional open-source software (OSS) (39.6% vs. 17.2%). Claude co-authors 34.9% of all commits, and four commit types (docs, perf, style, and refactor) carry substantially different meanings in plugin repositories than in traditional software. Most component types evolve independently, but within skills directories, natural-language instruction files and implementation scripts co-evolve at above-chance rates, with 78% of co-changes being functionally coupled, representing a new class of maintenance dependency not observed in traditional software engineering.

We introduce X-Adapter, a universal upgrader to enable the pretrained plug-and-play modules (e.g., ControlNet, LoRA) to work directly with the upgraded text-to-image diffusion model (e.g., SDXL) without further retraining. We achieve this goal by training an additional network to control the frozen upgraded model with the new text-image data pairs. In detail, X-Adapter keeps a frozen copy of the old model to preserve the connectors of different plugins. Additionally, X-Adapter adds trainable mapping layers that bridge the decoders from models of different versions for feature remapping. The remapped features will be used as guidance for the upgraded model. To enhance the guidance ability of X-Adapter, we employ a null-text training strategy for the upgraded model. After training, we also introduce a two-stage denoising strategy to align the initial latents of X-Adapter and the upgraded model. Thanks to our strategies, X-Adapter demonstrates universal compatibility with various plugins and also enables plugins of different versions to work together, thereby expanding the functionalities of diffusion community. To verify the effectiveness of the proposed method, we conduct extensive experiments and the results show that X-Adapter may facilitate wider application in the upgraded foundational diffusion model.

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), with prior work focusing on cutting-edge LLM applications like personal copilots. In contrast, simpler LLM applications, such as customer service chatbots, are widespread on the web, yet their security posture and exposure to such attacks remain poorly understood. These applications often rely on third-party chatbot plugins that act as intermediaries to commercial LLM APIs, offering non-expert website builders intuitive ways to customize chatbot behaviors. To bridge this gap, we present the first large-scale study of 17 third-party chatbot plugins used by over 10,000 public websites, uncovering previously unknown prompt injection risks in practice. First, 8 of these plugins (used by 8,000 websites) fail to enforce the integrity of the conversation history transmitted in network requests between the website visitor and the chatbot. This oversight amplifies the impact of direct prompt injection attacks by allowing adversaries to forge conversation histories (including fake system messages), boosting their ability to elicit unintended behavior (e.g., code generation) by 3 to 8x. Second, 15 plugins offer tools, such as web-scraping, to enrich the chatbot's context with website-specific content. However, these tools do not distinguish the website's trusted content (e.g., product descriptions) from untrusted, third-party content (e.g., customer reviews), introducing a risk of indirect prompt injection. Notably, we found that ~13% of e-commerce websites have already exposed their chatbots to third-party content. We systematically evaluate both vulnerabilities through controlled experiments grounded in real-world observations, focusing on factors such as system prompt design and the underlying LLM. Our findings show that many plugins adopt insecure practices that undermine the built-in LLM safeguards.

OpenClaw has rapidly established itself as a leading open-source autonomous agent runtime, offering powerful capabilities including tool integration, local file access, and shell command execution. However, these broad operational privileges introduce critical security vulnerabilities, transforming model errors into tangible system-level threats such as sensitive data leakage, privilege escalation, and malicious third-party skill execution. Existing security measures for the OpenClaw ecosystem remain highly fragmented, addressing only isolated stages of the agent lifecycle rather than providing holistic protection. To bridge this gap, we present ClawKeeper, a real-time security framework that integrates multi-dimensional protection mechanisms across three complementary architectural layers. (1) Skill-based protection operates at the instruction level, injecting structured security policies directly into the agent context to enforce environment-specific constraints and cross-platform boundaries. (2) Plugin-based protection serves as an internal runtime enforcer, providing configuration hardening, proactive threat detection, and continuous behavioral monitoring throughout the execution pipeline. (3) Watcher-based protection introduces a novel, decoupled system-level security middleware that continuously verifies agent state evolution. It enables real-time execution intervention without coupling to the agent's internal logic, supporting operations such as halting high-risk actions or enforcing human confirmation. We argue that this Watcher paradigm holds strong potential to serve as a foundational building block for securing next-generation autonomous agent systems. Extensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of ClawKeeper across diverse threat scenarios. We release our code.